The Global Landscape of State Bans on Religion and Belief Systems

By Brandon Taylorian — Around the world, states continue to ban religious communities outright, criminalise membership in certain denominations, or impose administrative penalties that effectively prohibit religious practice. While international human rights law – including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion, a significant number of governments maintain legal frameworks that suppress specific faith groups.

State bans often rely on allegations of ‘extremism’, ‘national security threats’, ‘deviant teachings’, or ‘public order’ concerns. In some contexts, membership in a prohibited religion carries prison sentences, loss of citizenship, or even the death penalty. In others, bans exist formally but remain sporadically enforced. Together, these measures reveal a persistent global pattern: religion and belief systems are regulated not only through registration regimes, but also through outright prohibition.

A Non‑Exhaustive Overview of State Bans (1964–2025)

The table in Figure 1 provides a non‑exhaustive overview of states and territories that have implemented formal bans on at least one religious denomination or belief system since 1964. The reasons given by authorities frequently invoke security, anti‑extremism legislation, or doctrinal deviation.

Figure 1 – Non-exhaustive of states that have banned at least one religious denomination (1964–2025)

Regional Overviews

Middle East and North Africa

Across the Middle East and North Africa, bans tend to be anchored in apostasy and blasphemy provisions, non-recognition of certain faiths, and broad public-order and security laws that restrict non-majority worship. In Iran, for example, the state’s non-recognition of the Bahá’í Faith functions as a de facto ban, reinforced by criminalisation of conversion away from Islam (apostasy) and related national-security framing. In Iraq, the 1970-era legal framework (including Law No. 105) is used to formalise bans on groups such as the Bahá’í Faith and Jehovah’s Witnesses, reflecting a model where religious legality is tied to state recognition. In Egypt, bans and restrictions are typically enforced through a combination of recognition limits (monotheistic/“heavenly” religions) and criminal provisions that can be used against unrecognised groups; these effectively prohibit Bahá’ís and Jehovah’s Witnesses, alongside wider “contempt of religion” enforcements. In Persian Gulf settings, anti-“sorcery/black magic” laws are sometimes applied as part of broader control of religious and spiritual practice (for instance, Qatar and the UAE).

Sub-Saharan Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa, outright bans appear in both authoritarian and hybrid systems, but the more common pattern is a mix of administrative prohibition, security framing, and (in some jurisdictions) criminalisation of “witchcraft” or “sorcery” that can overlap with restrictions on traditional religious practice. Eritrea is a flagship example: the long-standing ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses (1994), with consequences including loss of citizenship and prolonged detention—highlights an approach rooted in compulsory national-service policy and state demands for political participation. In Mauritania, the pattern is broader: public expression of religion other than Islam is effectively prohibited, reinforced by criminal code provisions that allow severe punishment for apostasy/blasphemy (even if capital punishment is rarely applied). In parts of Africa, bans on “witchcraft” are also written into criminal law (including Cameroon and the Central African Republic), showing how states may criminalise certain spiritual practices even when “religion” is constitutionally protected.

Europe

In Europe, bans most often travel through “extremism” and “terrorism” legal regimes, where courts and prosecutors can dissolve organisations, confiscate property, and criminalise participation. Russia is the clearest case: the 2017 Supreme Court decision liquidating Jehovah’s Witnesses as an “extremist organisation” sits within a broader anti-extremism framework that also affects other Muslim and non-Orthodox movements. The wider regional pattern is visible in de facto or partially recognised territories—such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria—where authorities may ban or deny registration to minority communities, often mirroring Russian legal language and security rationales. In Belarus, bans affect groups such as Ahmadiyya, with additional “cult” and public-order narratives used against other movements. The legal technique across the region is consistent: status is revoked or denied, then ordinary religious activity is reframed as unlawful participation in a prohibited entity.

South Asia

In South Asia, there is one major pattern: doctrinal policing through criminal law, often enforced via blasphemy-style offences and restrictions on self-identification. Pakistan is the central example. The legal structure there prevents Ahmadis from self-identifying as Muslims and criminalises core acts of worship and public expression. In addition, Pakistan’s blasphemy framework functions as an existential risk for religious minorities and dissenters, while separate provisions criminalise “magic/black magic/sorcery” in a way that can be used against spiritual healers or minority practices. The overall effect is that certain beliefs are not merely unpopular or unrecognised: they are legally punishable identities.

Central Asia

In Central Asia, bans are frequently driven by national-security and anti-extremism statutes, alongside restrictive religion laws that treat unregistered activity as illegal. Tajikistan (Jehovah’s Witnesses, banned 2007) illustrates the recurring justification: proselytisation, conscientious objection, and claims to “true religion” are reframed as threats to social stability. Kyrgyzstan justified its bans on the Unification Church and Ahmadiyya in national-security terms and linked to registration enforcement. In Kazakhstan, the state has the discretion to designate movements “extremist” and then criminalise membership or leadership activity, reflecting a regional pattern of administratively driven prohibition.

East and Southeast Asia

In East and Southeast Asia, there are two distinct models: (1) “cult/evil cult” designation systems used to ban movements and criminalise membership (China), and (2) public-order and national-service rationales used to deregister groups (Singapore), alongside state-sponsored religious governance (Vietnam). China lists several movements (e.g., Falun Gong, Church of Almighty God) banned under “cult” or “evil cult” narratives; this is the classic example of how a government can collapse religious and security categories into one legal label. In Vietnam, bans are connected to opposition to state-sponsored religious structures, such as the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (1981) and restrictions on Jehovah’s Witnesses (2007). In Singapore, bans are typically justified by refusal to perform national service and civic rituals; it is a legal strategy that treats certain religious obligations (conscientious objection) as incompatible with civic duties.

The Americas

The Americas feature fewer “classic” religious bans, but one contemporary example is Nicaragua’s suppression of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in 2023, framed through regulatory and administrative compliance narratives (including tax-reporting allegations). This illustrates an important variation: instead of banning “a religion” in general, a state can target specific institutions (orders, dioceses, charities) using corporate, tax, or NGO governance tools that remove legal personality and make religious work functionally impossible. Elsewhere in the Americas and Caribbean, colonial-era bans on practices such as Obeah remain on the books in some jurisdictions—sometimes unenforced, sometimes selectively enforced—showing how bans can be dormant but still enable policing.

Oceania

In Oceania, the most visible pattern is the persistence of colonial-era witchcraft/sorcery criminalisation (often alongside robust constitutional rights language). Nauru is one example, where pretending to exercise witchcraft is explicitly criminalised, pointing to the broader regional phenomenon whereby states maintain prohibitions on sorcery while contemporary practice and enforcement vary widely. This matters for FoRB analysis because it demonstrates how religions, beliefs and practices can be restricted indirectly: a state may not ban a named denomination, but can criminalise important elements of spiritual practice, healing, divination, or ritual authority.

Conclusion

In several jurisdictions, belonging to a prohibited religion carries criminal penalties. In countries such as Russia, Tajikistan and China, participation in the activities of a banned religious organisation can result in imprisonment, house arrest, or long‑term detention. In some states applying strict interpretations of apostasy laws, conversion away from the state religion may expose individuals to capital punishment.

These measures blur the distinction between administrative regulation and criminal law. When religious identity itself becomes criminalised, the right to manifest religion in worship, teaching, practice and observance is effectively extinguished. Not all prohibitions are uniformly enforced. In some countries, colonial‑era laws banning witchcraft or traditional spiritual practices remain formally in force but are rarely applied. Elsewhere, groups may be denied registration without an explicit ban, rendering them unable to operate legally. Such indirect prohibitions can be as restrictive as formal bans.

This layered approach – combining formal bans, registration refusals, anti‑extremism measures, and blasphemy or apostasy laws – demonstrates how governments use multiple legal tools to restrict minority faith communities.

The persistence of religious bans across diverse political systems highlights a fundamental challenge for freedom of belief globally. While some states justify prohibitions on grounds of security or social cohesion, international human rights standards require that any limitation on religious freedom be lawful, necessary, and proportionate.

Dr. Brandon Taylorian is a member of FOB's Scientific Committee