Calling a religious movement a “cult” does not tell us anything about the movement—but tells us a lot about the intolerance of those who use the label.
(A paper presented by Alessandro Amicarelli at the European Academy of Religion’s Ninth Annual Conference, LUISS University of Rome, July 3, 2026.)
by Alessandro Amicarelli — The topic of my presentation can be viewed from several perspectives, including media ethics, religious liberty, and the treatment of minority faith communities in democratic societies. The topic is the case of Shincheonji in the United Kingdom, active under the name New Heaven New Earth – Shincheonji Church of Jesus. The core question here is not whether one agrees with Shincheonji’s theology, but whether public discourse about this organization has been guided by objectivity or by prejudice.
Over the last few years, Shincheonji has grown significantly, and, in parallel with its growth, it has attracted substantial international controversy, which has, via other English-speaking countries, traveled into the British context. As with other religious minorities, following a standard rationale, when a new religious movement (NRM) enters a new environment, especially if the NRM is seen as original or “exotic,” the first way it is commented on is not from a sociological or legal perspective but from a polemical, prejudice-inspired one. This also happened to Shincheonji, which, in the UK, just like in other countries, has been labeled as a “cult,” often an easy shorthand for unfamiliar NRMs.
A peaceful community: Shincheonji members in the UK
My argument about the use of the label “cult” is straightforward, as its application to Shincheonji is often tied to public anxiety, media-biased framing, and sheer prejudice, coming from individuals who know little or nothing about the actual life of the Shincheonji community. Because the freedom of religion or belief of Shincheonji and its members is not a second-class freedom and is not lower than the freedom of speech of others, commentators, like everyone else, must resist the use of alarmist vocabulary that too often substitutes for impartial analysis.
Let us begin by focusing on some basic theoretical principles. First of all, in a society based on equality and the rule of law, religious minorities do not need to be classifiable as familiar or popular, or even “socially comfortable” or acceptable, to deserve legal protection. This is because, under the very basic principle of equality, entwined with the principle of the primacy of the law, basic human rights do not depend on majority approval; governments do not grant them; rather, they are part of the existence of all human beings. In this light, these rights apply equally and indiscriminately to old churches, new movements, and even unpopular groups and communities whose beliefs may appear unconventional to non-members. This is the essence of freedom of religion or belief in its more meaningful sense.
This principle is essential because the label “cult,” which is used very frequently and as if it did not harm those labeled, is not a neutral legal category; instead, it carries a heavy burden of prejudice. It is used to foster stigma, moral panic, and social suspicion, and to cause emotional condemnation by the general public. This label is used in media prose in a very self-explanatory way, as if the label itself explained the full story behind that term and, in doing so, exempted the commentator from any burden of proof or obligation to provide evidence. In other words, the term itself becomes a final judgment issued by a journalist, bypassing the task of demonstrating, with evidence, the existence of coercion or abuse or any unlawful or verifiable harm supposedly committed by “the cult.”
This point is especially true in the case of Shincheonji. With CESNUR and other friends of Freedom of Religion and Belief involved in the public defense of religious liberty, we have approached Shincheonji as it should be approached, namely as a minority Christian movement facing discrimination in several nations. We framed the issue surrounding Shincheonji as one of “scapegoating” this group during the COVID-19 crisis in South Korea, and I personally focused on how Shincheonji had been blamed in ways that went beyond careful evidence in a democratic country governed by the rule of law. This is demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Korea later handing down a final acquittal on all charges related to COVID-19 prevention obstruction, legally proving the church’s innocence.
Now, if we focus on the UK context, we can see, for instance, that British reporters have sometimes presented Shincheonji or New Heaven New Earth not just as a “cult” but as one that uses secrecy and manipulation to build its “cult” identity. In this regard, an article in “The Independent” reported the experience of a young woman who believed her boyfriend had been involved with the groups through deceptive recruitment and various forms of concealment.
A Shincheonji Bible lesson in the UK
At the same time, the same report records the group’s legal response to the allegations, which objects to the term “cult” as a derogatory and stereotyping label, notes that not all members are full-time missionaries, and states that some past lack of transparency was linked to hostility and bullying against its members. This shows that media reconstructions, just as public discussion, are not a settled account of the truth but rather a partisan representation of the facts that should leave room for the group’s defense.
What, then, would a reasonable analysis sound like? It should avoid asking whether an NRM looks strange or holds strange beliefs. On the contrary, it should focus on more neutral, scientifically sound questions, such as whether participation is voluntary and, once the group is joined, whether people can leave; whether any evidence corroborates allegations of coercion or violence, abuse, and exploitation, or whether the allegations are the result of media campaigns and other forms of hatred and hostility toward the group. All these questions help to understand the circumstances in the wider context through accurate verification.
One aspect plays a very important role in Shincheonji because it helps us better understand this church and make stronger counterclaims to anti-cult propaganda. For this reason, it deserves more attention than it usually receives: the well-structured, organized Bible study process that prospective participants undergo before fully joining the church. While this cannot, by itself, counterbalance all the accusations made by those who attack Shincheonji, it certainly does, at least, complicate the caricature of irrational adherence induced by manipulative actions. In fact, a lengthy process involving study first and only a later decision to join, or not to join, is not well captured by the sensational narrative of the manipulative cult forcefully converting vulnerable individuals.
Another important aspect to consider is the media’s practice of fabricating stories that then serve as templates for spreading false information internationally. In other words, when an NRM has been described as controversial in one country, using generalizations, unverified sources, and clichés, journalists in other countries will import the same stories with the same descriptors and tone, and sometimes even the same assumptions, without checking whether the local facts on which they are reporting have anything in common with the facts that happened in the other country and justify the imported narrative. This means that the derogatory label of “cult,” imported from another country, arrives even before the investigation has started in the new country, with the media responsible for spreading false information.
This is where my human rights framework becomes useful. My task as a human rights lawyer is not to romanticize Shincheonji or to declare every criticism invalid. That is not my job. My task is to ensure that minority communities are evaluated based on evidence, proportionality, and equal standards, in line with existing laws and international human rights standards. A human rights-based analysis does not exempt groups from scrutiny; it requires that scrutiny be fair. Likewise, it does not exempt the media and anti-cult groups from fair scrutiny.
We should also note an important contextual difference between the anti-Shincheonji narrative in the country of origin, South Korea, and what happens in the United Kingdom, where, although Shincheonji is an “imported religion,” it has proven very successful in attracting members. In fact, while the controversies around Shincheonji in South Korea are often intertwined with domestic religious and political competition, in the United Kingdom, stronger anti-Shincheonji efforts come from journalistic narratives and anti-cult frames. Overall, even though the environments and the mechanisms used differ, the effect of the hatred-constructed machinery is similar, i.e., a peaceful minority group becomes publicly accountable solely through suspicion.
The effects of the “constructed monster” are not trivial at all. Publicly labeling a religious group as a “cult” makes discrimination and violence against its members easy to justify, as the label suggests the group deserves that very treatment. Even if members are insulted, ridiculed, assaulted, or isolated, everything becomes justifiable because of a presumption of guilt encapsulated in that short and harmful term “cult.” Members are considered unable to think for themselves, as they were “brainwashed” and therefore unable to think and make decisions freely. Their beliefs and practices are not taken seriously either. The damage created by a label is horrendous and has serious implications for pluralism. A modern society should be able to distinguish disagreement from demonization. In doing so, a group’s theology can be open to criticism, as some aspects of its internal life are open to criticism. But this does not grant a license to insult and demonize, to create monsters, or to cause social panic. If criticism is not evidence-based or specific, and instead takes the form of an identity label, empty and void per se, but packed with prejudice, what should be an analysis becomes a simple stigma-production tool.
For this reason, because of these problems, the burden on scholars, as it should be for journalists and public institutions as well, is particularly heavy when dealing with issues involving minority religions. The easy anti-cult language should always be avoided, and so should their narrative, unless, which is very rare, demonstrable facts can precisely support their reconstructions. A thorough analysis can distinguish between testimony and proof, between allegation and reality, and between social oddity and proven wrongdoing. In all cases, scholars, journalists, and institutions should remember that freedom of religion or belief should be considered and applied neutrally, without prejudice, to all individuals.
So, what can we learn from the Shincheonji media framing in the United Kingdom? Certainly, we can say that when something is unfamiliar, it may be mistaken for dangerous, and that this media framing can easily turn into an investigation culminating in public judgment. However rhetorically powerful the label “cult” is, it is empty and void, as it does not represent the lives of Shincheonji members; it rather distorts them, completely ignoring the sense of fellowship, the worship, the study, the prayers, and the ordinary aspirations for a better life of many of its members.
My conclusion, therefore, is limited in its considerations but broader in scope. Shincheonji should not be shielded from examination if the examination is fair and neutral, nor should it be condemned by vocabulary alone. “Cult” is just a term, however powerful it may sound. Proper examination standards use empirical and legal instruments. They are deeply principled insofar as conduct is assessed, not judged, before examination; evidence is evaluated, not distorted, to caricature the NRM’s members appealing to social panic. The rights and freedoms of peaceful minorities must be protected even when they are unpopular with the majority of the local population. And this should not be considered special treatment, as it is the minimum requirement for a modern society that takes religious liberty seriously.
Published also on Bitter Winter
